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Abstract According to the Global Terrorism Database, Asia was the continent
that suers the highest number of terrorist attacks and the highest number of
casualties during the period 1998-2007. One of the numerous terrorist organizations
operating on its territory is Lashkar e Taiba (LeT) that was created in 1999. From
its inception to 2007, it has staged ninety attacks generating 1,945 casualties.
This paper presents a system dynamics model to try to reproduce the number of
monthly incidents of that organization. The construction is carried out adapting
to the organization those feedback processes that explain the survival over time
of a terrorist organization. Comparing the data series and the data obtained by
simulation, the paper examines the degree in which the model reproduces the
incidents of the organization. After checking the usefulness of the model, dierent
counter terrorist measures are tested in order to assess their eectiveness.
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1. The Problem
According to Global Terrorism Database (GTD) from 1998 to 20071, Asia is the
continent that suers the highest number of terrorist attacks in the world. That
outcome is a consequence of the great number of terrorist incidents that suer
countries such as Iraq, India, Afghanistan, Pakistan, Thailand or Philippines. Dur-
ing the period considered, Iraq, India and Afghanistan occupied the rst, the sec-
ond and the third position by incidents in the world with 2,828, 1,401 and 999
incidents, respectively; Pakistan is recorded by the database with 754 terrorist
events, Thailand with 690 and Philippines with 548 incidents. Figure 1 shows the
number of terrorist incidents in the period selected for the thirteen regions in
which the world is divided by the GTD. That gure illustrates that Middle East
and North Africa are the regions with the highest number of incidents followed by
South Asia and Southeast Asia, which diers in only one incident.
Figure 1: Terrorist attacks by regions, 1998-2007.
Moreover, Asia is the continent more punished by terrorism around the world
when that aspect is measured by means of the number of victims. The GTD
conrms that in 2007 and 2008 the six rst positions in the world regarding the
number of victims by terrorist events were occupied by countries in Asia. In par-
1 The GTD has not published data since 2007, yet.
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ticular, Iraq with 20,221 victims in 2007 and 12,957 in 2006 occupied the rst
position from 2003 to 2007; India with 2,845 in 2006 and 1,585 victims in 2007
attained the second position in those years.
Although most terrorist events are perpetrated by unknown people, 90% of the
incidents in Iraq, 50% in India, 33% in Afghanistan, 88% in Thailand and 79%
in Pakistan, numerous terrorist organizations of all types of tendencies, ethnic,
religious, nationalist or of political nature, are settled in the Asian continent. In
particular, India is the country where the higher number of terrorist organizations
operated during the selected interval, over forty organizations though some of
them are inactive, nowadays. Among the most active groups in the continent are
the Taliban in Afghanistan with 605 incidents and 3,049 victims and in Pakistan
with 44 attacks and 245 casualties; the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE),
which was defeated by the Sri Lanka military in 2009, with 260 events and 4,541
victims; the Maoist Insurgents in Nepal with 197 attacks and 1,302 casualties;
the United Liberation Front of Assam (ULFA) in India with 139 incidents and
1,196 victims; the group Abu Sayyaf in Philippines with 100 incidents and 1.034
casualties.
2. The Aim and the Rationale for our Modelling Choices
The data about the terrorist events reect some of the consequences of that type of
activities. Without trying to be exhaustive about the direct and collateral eects
of the terrorism, there are human eects such as the immediate suering produced
to the victims and their relatives, the generation or the increase of the fear felt by
the population, especially when it coexists with terrorism. There are also economic
eects. The GTD conrms that private citizens and their properties are the most
hit by terrorist events, even more than militaries, polices or government, in general,
that actually represent the human face of the counter-terrorism measures.
These negative eects for the population are actually objectives to reach for
any domestic terrorist organization because the creation of fear is considered a
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necessary step to achieve its constitutional objectives. It is a way of harassing to
the corresponding authority in order that it accepts the pretensions of the orga-
nization. But, the activities of a terrorist organization entail that the government
adopts a set of measures to ght against it. However, the governmental strategy,
in some occasions, has a high economic and human cost and, in addition, is not
often suciently eective. Then, could a model be constructed to test policies
against a terrorist organization? The aim of this paper is to construct a model
that explains the number of monthly incidents of a specic domestic terrorist or-
ganization. The System Dynamics methodology is selected to construct the model
taking into account that the number of incidents could arise from the actions and
reactions of both the terrorist organization and the government of the territory
where the organization carries out its attacks.
The causal structure of the model is based on the interrelationships arising in
a generic terrorist organization described in Soto et al. (2009, a, b). Firstly, the
structure considers the inuence of the fear felt by the population that coexist with
the organization and then, the inux on the organization of the personality of the
leader is incorporated. The fear plays an important role in the causal structure
being the key to explain the increase of resources in hands of the organization,
which guarantee its survival over time, and moreover, the counter-terror measures
adopted by the government.
The dynamic model for the organization Lashkar e Taiba (LeT) is completed
considering its own features, which are picked up from dierent publications. A
simulation exercise nds the number of monthly incidents of the organization.
Comparing the results obtained by simulation with the data series allow us to
assess, using dierent test, if the model reproduces the behaviour of the system.
When the model is accepted, it can be used as a tool for testing dierent counter
terrorist policies in order to defeat the selected organisation. The simulation model
is very versatility, which is an important reason to use the methodology.
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3. Previous Literature
Dierent approaches have been used to study the patterns of behaviour over time
shown by events attributed to terrorist organizations. Some authors use statistics
and econometrics methods. That approach is used by Enders and Sandler (2000)
and Clauset et al. (2007). Nevertheless, other studies construct models perceiving
the cause-eect relationships between a terrorist organization and a government.
This approach was selected by Fleichtinger (2001) et al. who integrates the inter-
actions between both actors in a problem of dynamic optimisation; Das (2008),
basing his study on a previous analysis carried out by Faria (2003), constructs a
predator-prey model considering the solution of two problems of static optimisa-
tion, one for the government and the other one for an organization. Likewise, it
could also be mentioned Rosendor et al. (2005) who point out dierent researches
in which the interactions between a terrorist organization and a government are
used to seek an equilibrium strategy according to game theory.
There are various precedents in System Dynamics literature about the useful-
ness of the methodology to study topics related to the terrorism. A rst analysis
was carried out by Rulof (1975) who pointed out the importance of System Dy-
namics to approach conict situations. A causal structure was constructed by
Coyle (1985) to make clear the feedback processes between a government and an
insurgence. More recently, many studies have appeared analysing dierent aspects
about the topic. Akcam et al. (2005) showed the advantages of the methodology
to study the ethnic terrorism. Grynkewich et al. (2006) examined the nancial
operations and the organizational behaviour of Salast Group for Preaching and
Fighting. Richmond (2009) analysed the governmental counter- terrorism measures
to ght against an insurgency.
In 2009, additionally, at least, other eight studies can be counted. Soto et
al. constructed two system dynamics models to analyse the number of incidents
of the organizations Tierra Vasca y Libertad (ETA) and the Fuerzas Armadas
Revolucionarias de Colombia (FARC) from 1998 to 2005; Anderson constructed
a system dynamics model as a basis that must be supplemented by additional
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theory from outside sources to enable calibration to a historical data set. Weaver
developed a system dynamics model to measure the popular support to insurgency
and the desertions as consequence of the success of the governmental counter-
terrorism policies. Schoenwald et al., based on a previous analysis of Merari (1993),
illustrated how the insurgent groups will pursue the resources necessaries to keep
on with the operations, regardless of the aims pursued. Arango et al. used the
methodology to evaluate public policies to reduce crime in the city of Medellin.
4. Aspects of the Domestic Organization
The characteristics of Lashkar e Taiba (LeT), with the meaning of Army of the
Pure, are collected from the South Asia Terrorism Portal (www.satp.org), the
GTD and the Terrorist Organization Proles data set (www.start.umd.edu). The
information obtained is synthesized by the following aspects:
 Islamic nature. Its objective is to introduce an Islamic state in South Asia.
 The organization is banned as a terrorist organization by India, Pakistan,
the United States, the United Kingdom, the European Union, Rusia and
Australia.
 Formed in 1990 in Afghanistan, it is thought that it is based in Muridke
near Lahore in Pakistan. Haz Muhammad Saeed is considered as a founder
though his current role within LeT is unclear. Dierent publications assert
that Maulana Abdul Wahid Kashmiri is currently its ocial leader.
 The main area of operations is Jammu and Kashmir. Nevertheless, it has
carried out attacks in other parts of India: New Delhi, Mumbai, Bangalore,
Hyderabad, Varanasi, Kolkata, Gujarat, etc.
 Its cadres are organised at district levels with `district commanders' in
charge. It is considered that within Pakistan, it has a network of train-
ing camps and branch oces, which undertake recruitment and collection
of nances. It reportedly has cells in many cities/towns outside Jammu and
Kashmir.
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 It is considered that it collects donations from institutions located in dif-
ferent places of the world. Likewise, it receives nancial support, material
and other forms of assistance from diverse organizations.
 The organization is considered closely linked to the Taliban and Al Qaeda.
According the GTD it has staged attacks with certain organizations: Jamiat
ul-Mujahedin (JuM), Jaish-e-Mohammad (JeM), nine times by each one;
Hizbul Mujahideen (HM), four times; Al-Mansoorian and Harkatul Jihad-e-
Islami, twice; Al-Badr, Al Barq, Al-Arifeen and Students Islamic Movement
of India (SIMI), once.
 Mainly, they use the armed assault followed by bombing/explosion for the
attacks.
 The organization has carried out ninety attacks. The rst attack (1999-04-
01) occurred in an army camp at Tehsil Goal in the Udhampur district of
Jammu and Kashmir state.Thirty-one Indian soldiers were killed.
 The number of casualties that the GTD assigns to the organization is 1,945;
the annual distribution is collected in Figure 2, where it is possible to stand
out the number of victims in 2006. In part, this result is due to the bloodiest
attack (December, 7) carried out by the group in Mumbai, India. In this
attack, the group killed at least 187 civilians and injured another 817. The
event went due to a series of train bombings and a string of seven blasts
that spanned 56 kms, from Churchgate to Mira Road.
 A monthly series is constructed (see Figure 3) for one hundred and ve
months using the daily information about terrorist attacks provided by the
GTD, in which are included armed assault, assassination, bombing/explosion,
facility/infrastructure attack, hijacking, hostage taking (barricade incident
and kidnapping), unarmed assault and unknown. This series allows to ob-
serve the following characteristics:
{ The monthly average of incidents is 0.85 with a standard deviation equals
to 1.22.
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Figure 2: Casualties attributed to LeT.
Figure 3: Attacks attribute to LeT, 1999-2007.
{ The organization did not carry out attacks for fty months (55%); for
thirty-ve times (38%), the organization only staged one attack; two at-
tacks a month occurred for fourteen months (15%); for two months it
carried out seven attacks; for one month, four incidents and nally, for
three months, three attacks2.
{ Five months is the longest period without attacks. That fact occurred
two times.
{ For twenty-seven months, a month without attacks went followed by a
month without attacks.
2 These data allow us to accept the null hypothesis, 95% signication level, about the
number monthly of incidents follows a Poisson distribution with an average equal to the
average of the sample.
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{ When the organization performs two o more incidents on the same month,
then that number of attacks is not repeated on the next month. Never-
theless, that fact is not observed when the organization carries out less
than two incidents.
{ Except in two cases, if the ninety months are arranged consecutively into
groups of four months, we can nd at least a month without attacks inside
each group.
5. The Dynamic System
The decisions made by a domestic terrorist organization in order to attain its
objectives together with those adopted by the government of the territory where
the organization operates, can be linked by several causal relationships in a way
that it is possible to construct a dynamic system.
The formation of the model structure requires, in rst place, to study some
primary relationships between a government and a domestic terrorist organization.
Any domestic terrorist organization expects some radical change in some as-
pects, such as political, social, cultural, religious, ethnic, ideological, etc., related
to a specic geographical territory. In addition, it expects to get these changes
soon. However, its outlooks come into conict with the ideas defended by the gov-
ernment of the territory. The denial to its pretensions by the government leads the
terrorist organization to create an atmosphere of fear on the citizens living in the
territory to put pressure on the government. But, the fear felt by the population
forces to the government to adopt a set of measures to ght against the domestic
organization. In this way, government and terrorist organization are involved in
several feedback processes that would constitute the base of a system dynamics
model.
The rst feedback processes arises taking into account that any terrorist orga-
nization needs certain resources to survive. Three dierent types of resources can
be considered necessary for the survival of an organization: human, economic and
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material resources. In fact, the organization needs people building your hopes up,
that adopt the ideas defending by the organization unselshly and capable of de-
veloping dierent tasks. In this regard, the organization will require to proselytise
to increase the number of adepts, indoctrinate for integrating new members, teach
to use and manipulate arms, carry out the attacks, guard possible targets, look for
nancing, etc. Usually, the members of a terrorist organization are divided into
groups, the commands, formed by few persons by security, so every group is in
charge of a special task. Of all those groups, the operative commands would take
charge of the attacks. In addition to human resources, the organization also needs
economic resources to nance its activities and to proportionate means of living
to its members. In this instance, it has to provide clothes, food, shelter, journeys,
etc. Moreover, the organization needs material resources, such as ammunition,
explosives, bombs, arms, etc. to carry out the attacks.
It could be distinguished two types of activities performed by a terrorist or-
ganization related to the obtaining of economic and material resources. On the
one hand, the organization would obtain economic resources from the population
as a result of the fear felt by them. The fear would increase as a consequence of
both the number of attacks and the damage produced by each attack and would
decrease taking into account that the population forget. On the other hand, the
organization could get both types of resources using the same means that any an-
other organization outside of the law. These incidents do not pursue fear creation,
just obtaining resources, and consequently, they are not considered as terrorist
incidents. Because of this, such type of activities will be named irregular activities
in which can be included: trac of drugs, trac of arms, etc.
In addition to the resources, the survival of the organization requires an indi-
vidual leader, or a group leader, for managing the organization, encouraging its
members to carry out certain tasks and mark the guidelines of behaviour in order
to achieve the success of the ideals defended by it. In particular, the leader will de-
termine a strategic plan and all tactical aspects tied to it. For example, the leader
will make decisions about the responsibility of each command, targets to reach,
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number of attacks, where and how they will be undertaken or the opportunity of
each activity. This last aspect means that the leader assesses the advisability of
every attack according to the current objectives of the organization. For example,
the leader assesses if the attack entails too risk for the executors or even, for the
own organization.
Figure 4 illustrate feedback loops inuencing the number of incidents of the
organization LeT. The human resources have been divided into two levels: the be-
ginners, individuals in formation that do not carry out tasks for the organization
and the active members that are distributed by cells. The gure shows that the
economic resources in hands of the organization increase with the fear, due to the
contributions of population and foreigners, and decreases with the spending nec-
essary to maintain its human resources. Additionally, a fraction of the economic
resources is dedicated to acquire material resources. The diagram shows that the
organization obtains not only material resources by purchases, but also from irreg-
ular activities. For this organization, it is assumed that if the fear increases, the
success of the irregular activities diminishes. Likewise, the model considers that
the increase of material resources due to irregular activities is aected by a random
number obtaining from a normal distribution. Finally, it is possible to observe that
the material resources decrease with its use as a consequence of the consumption
in the attacks.
The operative commands, which always stand by to carry out the attacks, are
a percentage of all squads, though its number could be limited depending on the
material resources in hands of the organization because both persons and material
resources are necessary for the attacks.
The assumption about the inuence of the fear on the success of the irregular
activities is made taking into account the characteristics of the organization with
regarding to the distribution of the number of attacks. Likewise, that distribution
is also attributed by the model to a strategic behaviour adopted by the leader.
In this way, it is assumed that the organization limits the number of attacks and
the opportunity not only obeys to reasons of caution, but also depends on the
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Figure 4: Casual structure associated to LeT.
number of attacks carried out by the organization in the short term. In addition,
the opportunity of carrying out the attacks must considerer the counter-terror
policies adopted by the government. Consequently, all the incidents planned by
the organization cannot be successful. In order to take into account this fact, the
model considers that the success of the attacks is basically controlled by a random
number obtained from a Poisson distribution. The mean of the distribution, which
is the only parameter to obtain the random number, is function of the fear: more
fear, less average. All these assumptions are picked up in the causal diagram where
the opportunity depends on the fear and on the number of incidents carried out
by the organization in previous months.
Figure 5 shows the number of incidents that the simulated organization de-
veloped for one hundred and ve months. A simple analysis, about the simulated
data, nds that the monthly average is 0.73 and the standard deviation is 0.8. The
simulated data also show that three times the organization fulls three attacks
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though now, the maximum number of attacks per month is three. Likewise, two
times during the period of simulation, for four consecutive months, the organiza-
tion does not carry out attacks opposite ve consecutive months of the data series.
The inactivity is similar for both organizations: 48 months in front of 50 for data
series.
Though the simulated data dier from the data series, above all, if they are
compared point by point, the monthly averages and the standard deviations are
closer and as a result, the decomposition of the mean square error (MSE) (Sterman,
p. 875) determines the following result: which guarantees that the majority of error
is unsystematic.
Therefore, the results can be considered acceptable because the model tries to
explain the dynamics observed in the data series more than to replicate its accu-
rate behaviour. Moreover, it is possible to check that the model endures extreme
conditions and it does not show any special sensitivity under light modications
of parameters and initial conditions of the levels. As a result, the model could be
used to test the usefulness of certain policies to ght against the organization.
Figure 5: Simulated incidents.
6. Counter-terrorism Policies
This section explores the possibilities of implementing new measures in order to
suppress the attacks of the organization. Four dierent types of policies are im-
plemented in the model of simulation. These policies are held for twenty months,
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which are assessed after 105 months, in order to determine the best one to attain
the aim.
The rst policy focuses on the human resources. It supposes that the govern-
ment is able to arrest 5% of active members each month. The second policy focuses
on the ow of irregular acquisitions of material resources: the governmental poli-
cies against the organization prevent of that possibility for twenty months. The
third policy acts on the ow of economic resources: the organization is unable to
get that type of resource, and nally, the fourth policy is aimed at the stock of
material resources: the counter- terror policy achieves a monthly decrease next to
25% of materials resources in the hands of the organization.
Assuming the success of these policies, Figure 6 shows the evolution of the
number of operative commands of the simulated organization. The gure contains
ve paths corresponding to the scenarios in consecutive order though the rst
path shows the evolution of the number of operative commands when none policy
is adopted. It simply extents for twenty months the path followed by the simulated
organization.
Observing Figure 6 it is possible to check that the best policy, among the
selected ones, for ghting against the organization is whether act against the hu-
man resources or try to decrease the material resources. Notice that the operative
commands decreases more quickly with the fourth policy that with the rst policy;
although in both cases, the decrease is step by step. The other two policies analysed
do not achieve a diminishing of the number of operative commands, maintaining
to the organization with the same potential of damage.
7. Conclusions
According with Calduch (1993, p. 330), the terrorist violence has the characteristic
of being unforeseeable as consequence of two aspects: the vulnerability of the mod-
ern societies and the impossibility of forecasting the moment, the place, the target
and the modality in which each terrorist action will present itself. This author
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Figure 6: Responses to counter-terror policies.
asserts that the terrorist strategy has to be totally random and it cannot follow
established guidelines of behaviour. These characteristics make dicult to forecast
the evolution over time of any variable associated to a terrorist organization, even
in the short term. He concludes that it might be possible to estimate the num-
ber of members or operative cells at each moment of time as well as its economic
resources or even its material resources. Nevertheless, the estimations can change
daily as a result of the random behaviour associated to terrorist strategy.
In agreement with Calduch about the diculties to know the future behaviour
over time of a terrorist organization, the understanding of the interactions between
the actions of an organization and a government helps to explain the procedures
used by an organization. But the formation of a causal structure explaining the
operative way of an organization is not the only contribution of System Dynamics
methodologies to the analysis of terrorism. In fact, taking into account that each
terrorist organization has its own peculiarities the methodology would enable to
capture those specic characteristics. In this way it would be possible to contrast
real data with simulated data in order to assess the capacity of the model to
reproduce the behaviour shown by the organization. Moreover, the simulation
model oers the possibility of testing governmental policies to determine the best
counter-terror policy.
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In order to widen this study, the model could be used in dierent ways. For
example, it could focus on the number of fatalities, casualties or big damages
with regard to the same organization. Nevertheless, the model could be adapted
to study another terrorist organization. In particular, it could be checked with a
terrorist organization presenting a dierent pace of activity.
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